DISSERTATION

What is Real in Political Realism? An Exploration of Authority in the work of Arendt, Machiavelli, and Kautilya

The overarching question that motivates me intellectually concerns political epistemology: what do societies believe they know, and what tools do they believe can reliably be used to acquire knowledge? The answers to this question have varied significantly in different times and places to great consequence. What “legitimate authority” consists of (that is, how well authority is accepted by a people), for instance, has historically depended on the answers to this pivotal question.

Through three case studies, my dissertation argues that realists from very different times and places understand that epistemic issues strongly influence how authority can be wielded sustainably in any given regime. Since the formalization of realism by International Relations theorists during the twentieth century, historians of political thought have struggled to understand what enables the retroactive application of this label to figures that predate it. In the dissertation I put forth an explanation of why we might find disparate accounts of realism valid: realism’s self-ascribed endeavor—or at least its nominal claim—is that it works with reality, and the perspectivism that characterizes the contemporary study of the history of philosophy means that we understand realism as looking different in different contexts. Almost unwittingly, we identify as realists the writers who work shrewdly with rhetoric within the epistemic frameworks of their societies to establish and/or maintain authority.

The chapter on Arendt focuses on an essay from Between Past and Future titled “What is Authority?” and on On Revolution, which compares the outcomes of the French Revolution with those of the American Revolution. Arendt speaks of American revolutionaries as realists who understood the demands of the erosion of de facto authority in modern world and sought to find a way of wielding authority in a pluralistic political sphere. My analysis of Machiavelli focuses on his critique of the Church and the apparently contradictory importance he places on religion for the health of a society. I employ his political writings (The Prince, Discourses on Livy, Florentine Histories) and his play Mandragola to argue that his critique stems from the opinion that the Church does not employ the political authority which comes hand in hand with the epistemic authority it wields (over popular beliefs) towards glorious ends. He accuses its agents of abdicating the responsibility that accompanies authority. Finally, the study of the Arthashastra serves as a counter to both Machiavelli’s and Arendt’s worlds. Kautilya’s world is one of great epistemic certainty—a world in which authority is exercised quite straightforwardly by the King, who does not go out of his way to legitimize it. While Machiavelli and Arendt must account for the people’s desire for liberty, which often presents a challenge to the consolidation and the exercise of authority, the Kautilyan King must focus simply on ensuring that his citizens are well looked after. The discussion of politics in the Arthashastra takes the knowledge imparted by Hindu scripture for granted and employs reason to trace out its implications for the political sphere—one of which is absolute deference to a well-born king. The book project that will follow from my dissertation will continue to explore political realism as an approach that assumes that sustainable authority must stem from a profound grasp of the epistemic foundation of the area over which authority is to be wielded.

ARTICLES IN PREPARATION (manuscripts available on request)

"On a Science of the Political: Hans Morgenthau and International Relations Theory"

This paper provides an overview of the intellectual context in which the discipline of International Relations and “Realism” were born, by discussing the interlocutors and inheritors of Hans Morgenthau and his work in Politics Among Nations (1948). Although he was influenced by Max Weber—who proclaimed in “Science as a Vocation” (1917) and “Politics as a Vocation” (1919) that the rigidity of Wissenschaft made it incapable of capturing politics in its entirety—Morgenthau’s “six principles of realism” contributed to the perception of the human capacity to capture the reality of the political systematically. Morgenthau had critiqued the scientization of the political. Yet, in the United States, he became a political scientist. I believe that this turn was a result of the realization that social science wields a lot of epistemic and political authority in the U.S.; Morgenthau was propelled in the direction of social science by his desire to be politically effective. 

"The Geometricity of Mary Wollstonecraft's A Vindication of the Rights of Men"
This article establishes that Mary Wollstonecraft takes a geometric approach to arguing for the equal ‘rights of humanity’ in A Vindication of the Rights of Men (1790), the first published book-length critique of Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790). Dissatisfied with hypothetical and isolated if-then statements about rights in post-revolutionary discourse on the ‘rights of man’ and Burke’s critique of it, she develops a model of reasoning that synthesises reason and experience to satisfy the methodological rigour of Enlightenment rationalist philosophy and to honour those who could not afford the luxury of partaking in such argumentation.

"Rethinking the Legitimation Crisis via two textbooks on Conspiracy: Machiavelli's Discourses on Livy and Kautilya's Arthashastra" (coauthored with Emma Schmidt)
Kautilya (c.300 BC) and Machiavelli (1469-1527) are realists who take a keen interest in the characteristics of conspiracies and their significance for politics. This article explores what the differences in their treatments of this topic, despite their shared love for wily politicking, say about how they conceptualize the legitimacy of governing bodies. We argue that their distinct views of fortune and the variations in their discussions of how conspiracies unfold in practice suggest that while Kautilya assumes legitimacy to be fixed, not subject to the vicissitudes of public opinion, Machiavelli holds it to be contingent, only secure when the people have a modicum of stability in their power and possessions. Machiavelli conceives of legitimacy as contingent regardless of regime type, in a manner that suits our contemporary sensibilities. 

"Aristotle’s Politics on Justly Disputing Fellow Citizens"
The word ἀμφισβήτησις (dispute, controversy) makes at least thirty appearances in Aristotle’s Politics. Three of these appearances concern themselves with things that are indisputable: the necessity of good laws, the balanced nature of the blessed, and the primacy of education. The remaining identify popular disagreements either about how justice ought to be manifested or about whether it ought to be a salient criterion at all. Aristotle claims that political dispute is eternal because citizens are always making justice claims, but their vision of a just community varies. He differentiates dispute from στάσις (civic disorder) which occurs when arrogance, fear, and contempt come to dominate citizen engagement; civic disorder follows the corruption of the regime. In this article, I establish the distinct significance of disputes in politics by proposing that Aristotle understands citizenship to be a function of active engagement in dispute to direct the city in the direction of one’s conception of justice. 

PUBLIC FACING

What is means to love a city: Niccolò Machiavelli and his Florence
The tradition of political realism has a reputation for being pessimistic—that is, for seeing and expecting the worst from the world, its individuals, and its states. Yet, despite all his realism, Niccolò Machiavelli was a romantic about his city. He famously said in a letter to his friend, diplomat Francesco Vettori, “I love my city more than my own soul” (amo la patria piu dell’ anima). In this short piece I make the case that proficient realists acknowledge and affirm their reality and attempt to better it even when the odds are not in their favour, even when they themselves are not optimistic.

Decolonizing Truth with Lewis R. Gordon
In February 2023, Lewis R. Gordon, professor and department head of philosophy at the University of Connecticut, delivered the lecture “Decolonizing Philosophy, Decolonizing Theory” at the University of Notre Dame. In this piece, I provide an overview of this lecture in which Gordon argued that truth does not exist “out there”; he holds that the pursuit of reality should not be preoccupied by substance metaphysics, and that the idea of the non-relational human being is completely incomprehensible. Gordon underscores that nobody can reasonably claim reality for their own singular use.

A letter from the editors
In this letter, my co-editors and I set the tone for the 2022-23 academic year at Europe in the World, a blog run by the Nanovic Institute for European Studies. We answer the question "Can European studies scholars avoid eurocentrism?" by asserting the present interconnectedness of this world demands that we present European phenomena alongside their broader impacts on the globe, and investigate the inspiration these phenomena might take from what is happening beyond the European continent. We also explain that appropriately locating all things European in the world—pointing out their parallels and distinctions—better enables us to better discuss the sort of inherently complicated academic research the blog seeks to make available to a broader, non-academic audience.